Rick Perry has been drifting back to Earth for two weeks. He had rocky performances in the last two debates, and Mitt Romney has floated back up in polls to the low 20s. The gap between them, once in double digits and growing, has narrowed. The question is this: Does Perry have strategic or tactical problems?
The answer: A little bit of both. Let’s start with the foundational stuff.
To understand Perry’s strategic challenge, you have to understand the basic rationale of his campaign. There are two camps of GOP primary voters: establishment Republicans and insurgents. (It used to be said that the difference was between moderate, business Republicans and social conservatives, but nearly all GOP primary voters are conservative these days.)
Romney’s candidacy is incredibly weak. Despite campaigning for president for most of the last seven years — with only a brief respite while John McCain was the nominee — Romney couldn’t get above 25 percent in the polls. Insurgent voters dislike him. Hunks of establishment voters hung with him — sort of. After all, he was the front-runner and next in line, and that’s what establishment types do. But his weak numbers suggested that even these establishment types weren’t in love. They just weren’t going to sign up with any of the other candidates, who were all insurgents themselves.
Enter Perry. He was the candidate who could unite both the insurgents and the establishment. He was on board the tea party express early, but had been governor of a big state for 11 years. He could talk about prayer and small government, but was comfortable around big business. He would pull the two strands of the party together.
It was high-concept stuff. From the start, Perry developed a powerful conservative-populist critique of President Obama. He avoided criticizing any of the other Republican candidates. Clearly, Perry envisioned a bloodless coup in which he stormed into the race, took over the nomination process, and rode to the finish line without having to fight off Romney, Michele Bachmann, Rick Santorum, Ron Paul, et al.
And as it turns out, this was a strategic mistake. The insurgents flooded to Perry immediately — witness the hollowing out of Bachmann’s numbers. And some of Romney’s establishment moved — his support dipped by about a third after Perry launched. But big parts of the Republican establishment — typified by people like columnists Jennifer Rubin and Michael Gerson and Karl Rove — pushed back against Perry, hard. The resistance among establishment elites was enough to stanch the flow of establishment voters. If Perry is going to get those folks, he’s going to have to fight for them. His mistake was not realizing this sooner: He should have turned on Romney immediately after joining the race.
What Perry has to do now isn’t rocket science: The only place establishment voters have to go is Romney. Perry needs to make him an unacceptable alternative. And that’s where we get to Perry’s tactical problem: How does he pole-ax Mitt?
It’s not a question of scruples, mind you. Perry has left plenty of roadkill across the Texas plains. Romney presents four avenues of attack, and at last week’s debate, Perry road-tested three. (1) He suggested Romney was a liberal. (2) He charged that Romney was a serial flip-flopper. (3) He argued that Romney can’t be trusted on Obamacare, because of Romneycare.
At the debate, Perry didn’t make any of these arguments well. But that hardly matters. You do the important hatchet work on the stump and in ads, not in debates. And besides, there’s a fourth option: (4) Romney as the layoff king and destroyer of jobs at Bain Capital.
Each of these charges is attractive, but Perry can’t make all four. He is going to have to pick one (or at most two) and stay with it, running the attacks into the ground. But which represents the richest vein?
That’s tough to say. Calling Romney Obama-Lite is probably the weakest charge. Certainly Perry could make hay over Romney’s support of Planned Parenthood. But voters tend to care more about where a politician is now, unless the politician has been particularly promiscuous with his positions. And Romney has changed his mind on abortion, immigration, Social Security, TARP, the NRA and stem cell research. (This is a partial list.)
His biggest flip-flop has been on health care reform. After passing the model for Obamacare in Massachusetts, Romney now maintains that it is an abomination, one he’ll chuck overboard his first day in office. And maybe he will. So perhaps Perry should go after him for the federal bailout that Romney’s company, Bain Capital, received on his watch. Or the hundreds of employees who were laid off after Romney performed his turnaround magic — an issue Romney has never had to grapple with yet, despite the fact that his business experience is now his biggest electoral rationale.
Whatever line Perry chooses, he should move soon. Someone else is going to get a second look by early-state voters, and Perry will want Romney to be tottering by the time that happens.
The answer: A little bit of both. Let’s start with the foundational stuff.
To understand Perry’s strategic challenge, you have to understand the basic rationale of his campaign. There are two camps of GOP primary voters: establishment Republicans and insurgents. (It used to be said that the difference was between moderate, business Republicans and social conservatives, but nearly all GOP primary voters are conservative these days.)
Romney’s candidacy is incredibly weak. Despite campaigning for president for most of the last seven years — with only a brief respite while John McCain was the nominee — Romney couldn’t get above 25 percent in the polls. Insurgent voters dislike him. Hunks of establishment voters hung with him — sort of. After all, he was the front-runner and next in line, and that’s what establishment types do. But his weak numbers suggested that even these establishment types weren’t in love. They just weren’t going to sign up with any of the other candidates, who were all insurgents themselves.
Enter Perry. He was the candidate who could unite both the insurgents and the establishment. He was on board the tea party express early, but had been governor of a big state for 11 years. He could talk about prayer and small government, but was comfortable around big business. He would pull the two strands of the party together.
It was high-concept stuff. From the start, Perry developed a powerful conservative-populist critique of President Obama. He avoided criticizing any of the other Republican candidates. Clearly, Perry envisioned a bloodless coup in which he stormed into the race, took over the nomination process, and rode to the finish line without having to fight off Romney, Michele Bachmann, Rick Santorum, Ron Paul, et al.
And as it turns out, this was a strategic mistake. The insurgents flooded to Perry immediately — witness the hollowing out of Bachmann’s numbers. And some of Romney’s establishment moved — his support dipped by about a third after Perry launched. But big parts of the Republican establishment — typified by people like columnists Jennifer Rubin and Michael Gerson and Karl Rove — pushed back against Perry, hard. The resistance among establishment elites was enough to stanch the flow of establishment voters. If Perry is going to get those folks, he’s going to have to fight for them. His mistake was not realizing this sooner: He should have turned on Romney immediately after joining the race.
What Perry has to do now isn’t rocket science: The only place establishment voters have to go is Romney. Perry needs to make him an unacceptable alternative. And that’s where we get to Perry’s tactical problem: How does he pole-ax Mitt?
It’s not a question of scruples, mind you. Perry has left plenty of roadkill across the Texas plains. Romney presents four avenues of attack, and at last week’s debate, Perry road-tested three. (1) He suggested Romney was a liberal. (2) He charged that Romney was a serial flip-flopper. (3) He argued that Romney can’t be trusted on Obamacare, because of Romneycare.
At the debate, Perry didn’t make any of these arguments well. But that hardly matters. You do the important hatchet work on the stump and in ads, not in debates. And besides, there’s a fourth option: (4) Romney as the layoff king and destroyer of jobs at Bain Capital.
Each of these charges is attractive, but Perry can’t make all four. He is going to have to pick one (or at most two) and stay with it, running the attacks into the ground. But which represents the richest vein?
That’s tough to say. Calling Romney Obama-Lite is probably the weakest charge. Certainly Perry could make hay over Romney’s support of Planned Parenthood. But voters tend to care more about where a politician is now, unless the politician has been particularly promiscuous with his positions. And Romney has changed his mind on abortion, immigration, Social Security, TARP, the NRA and stem cell research. (This is a partial list.)
His biggest flip-flop has been on health care reform. After passing the model for Obamacare in Massachusetts, Romney now maintains that it is an abomination, one he’ll chuck overboard his first day in office. And maybe he will. So perhaps Perry should go after him for the federal bailout that Romney’s company, Bain Capital, received on his watch. Or the hundreds of employees who were laid off after Romney performed his turnaround magic — an issue Romney has never had to grapple with yet, despite the fact that his business experience is now his biggest electoral rationale.
Whatever line Perry chooses, he should move soon. Someone else is going to get a second look by early-state voters, and Perry will want Romney to be tottering by the time that happens.
